The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher's version. Please see the 'permanent WRAP URL' above for details on accessing the published version and note that access may require a subscription. Moving between the southern and western frontiers of Iraq, the ʿAmārāt have seldom been the focus of historical enquiry, but their attempts to navigate the disturbed interwar landscape offer a window onto the changing prospects for Bedouin groups across the Arab East. Building on a close reading of colonial sources, the article reveals how important social, economic, and political dynamics of Bedouin life persisted to shape relations within the new mandates, as the ʿAmārāt, their sheikh, and the young colonial state all jostled for influence and authority.
Introduction
In the 1920s and 1930s, as British and French officials extended their authority over the arid frontiers of their new Middle Eastern mandates, they often bemoaned the quality of Bedouin leadership in modern times. Sheikhs nowadays, many complained, were cosseted and avaricious, more distant from their tribesmen than their forebears had been. Where once they could be left to their own devices, it increasingly fell to government to supervise sheikhs, to reinforce their authority, and in the last resort, to fill the void.2 Historians are less inclined to blame the victim but nonetheless observe a collapse of Bedouin political autonomy in the first half of the twentieth century. The interwar years in particular are seen as a watershed for Bedouin groups across the Arab East, a time when external forces overrode their internal dynamics. The political landscape was recast into the League of Nations mandates of Great Britain and France, while new international boundaries, the advent of mechanised transport, and renewed state proscriptions against intertribal raiding eroded the economic and social foundations of long-range nomadic pastoralism. For Kurt Franz, in his extensive sketch of two thousand years of Bedouin history, the birth of the mandates "rang in the rapid and far-reaching loss of Bedouin autonomy," as the intrinsic dynamics of Bedouin polities were overwhelmed by the external logics of colonialism and the international state system.3 Besieged on all sides, the zaman al-shuyūkh (age of the sheikhs) passed into memory. 4 This article explores how much freedom and agency the Bedouin retained in the era of colonial "divide-and-rule." It does so by tracking the fortunes of a particular Bedouin group through those crucial interwar years, attempting to see events through their eyes. In one sense, the case for abrupt discontinuity has gone by default. International and imperial histories of the Middle East
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The ʿ Amārāt, their Sheikh, and the Colonial State jesho 58 (2015) in this period have been predominantly state-centric. Rather than emphasise Bedouin actors or choices, they present the central authorities as active agents awakening dormant hinterlands and their "marginal" populations. There is little place for Bedouin agency in narratives of the progressive rationalisation of national space, the spread of "law and order," or the state's monopolisation of violence.5
And yet, Bedouin groups across the interwar Arab East did not find themselves facing fully-sovereign national states-not yet, at least-but colonial states, and ones subject to the new form of mandatory rule at that. This fact is widely taken for granted; the specific dynamics of colonial rule are less frequently explored. Among historians, there is a growing awareness that we may have exaggerated the power of colonial rule, set too much store by its technological innovations, and overstated the speed and extent of its break with the past.6 In practice, European mandatory rule often resulted in a proliferation of sources of authority, with multiple, overlapping layers of jurisdiction. In Iraq, for example, the "state" was no homogeneous entity but itself the site of a triangular struggle among the Hashemite court, nationalist politicians, and the many branches of British officialdom. This was especially the case in frontier zones that officials struggled to render "legible," and where the stakes for asserting control-having a say in border disputes and influencing foreign affairs-were so high.7 In these circumstances, how did sheikhs and ordinary In addition to the long-standing interest in how empires have depended on the cooperation of local elites, the recent tendency to explore European imperialism in terms of a multiplicity of networks has emphasised the pluralism and competition of differing imperial agendas, their dependence on (often incomplete) sets of "colonial knowledge," and the potential for missed connections and unfinished and conflicting enterprises. For comparative studies of the Middle Eastern mandates, alive to the limits of colonial power and the continuities with the Ottoman period, see M. Thomas, Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder After 1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008) , and The British and French Mandates in Comparative Perspective, ed. N. Méouchy and P. Sluglett (Leiden: Brill, 2004 ). 7 For a reconstruction of the practices of "desert administration" on the frontiers of Egypt, Trans-Jordan, and Iraq, see R.S.G. Fletcher, British Imperialism and 'The Tribal Question': Desert Administration and Nomadic Societies in the Middle East, 1919-1936 Bedouin themselves perceive "the state"? And how far did their own experiences and expectations of power inform the behaviour of government officials, often operating at the geographic limits of their authority?
The ʿAmārāt provide a fascinating case study with which to explore these problems. Part of the well-known ʿAnaza confederation, their migrations could cover a vast area of the southeastern Syrian Desert between Aleppo, Karbala, and the edge of the Nafūd, bordering the French mandate for Syria, the British mandate for Trans-Jordan, and the domains of Ibn Saʿūd. Estimates of their size vary considerably, from more than four thousand tents in 1919 to about three thousand in 1932, split between the Jabal (1700) and Dahamsha (1300) subdivisions.8 Either way, the ʿAmārāt's location at the intersection of so many contending parties and in a terrain that interwar states still found difficult to control afforded them a political importance out of proportion to their numbers. Their sheikh in this period, Fahd Ibn Hadhdhāl, was widely seen as a shrewd political operator ("the greatest nomad potentate on the western borders of Iraq"), revered for "his wisdom and skill in tribal diplomacy."9 Like Nūrī al-Shaʿlān of the Ruwala, he employed a clerk to project influence and correspond with actors across the Syrian Desert-and there was much to keep abreast of. The ʿAmārāt's history is entwined with negotiating a wealth of sectional, tribal, dynastic, international, and imperial interests, from old rivalries with the Shammar to the new factional politics of the Iraq mandate. Nor could Ibn Hadhdhāl take the existence of a single ʿAnaza political community for granted. His family, sheikhs of the Jabal subdivision, claimed a notional authority over the Ḍanā Bishr and, indeed, the entire ʿAnaza confederation; in practice, his standing among the Ḍanā Muslim (especially the Ruwala), with subdivisions such as the Dahamsha, and with ordinary ʿAmārāt tribesmen was a matter of continual negotiation. It was with reference to Ibn Hadhdhāl's Press, 2015 authority, after all, that Gertrude Bell described "overlordship among the Bedouin" as "a loose term."10 Despite the rich potential of this political field, historical work on the ʿAmārāt is still patchy and incomplete. (Within the ʿAnaza, the history of the Ruwala is much better known.) Like all attempts to bring a Bedouin perspective to the foreground, it must also wrestle with formidable absences and silences, from the dearth of surviving Bedouin testimony to the exclusion of voices and the denial of alternative pasts by normatively national historiographies.11 But the ʿAmārāt's efforts to navigate a fraught political landscape did catch the attention of the region's growing bureaucracies in the early twentieth century. Indeed, the apparent marginality of ʿAmārāt territory, located on the borders of multiple antagonistic parties, helped generate the paper trail that has rendered them more visible. During the First World War, the ʿAmārāt operated along the flanks of both the British and Ottoman armies. In the 1920s, renewed tensions along the Iraq-Najd frontier sparked a flurry of correspondence about the group. These colonial records are a major source, but fragments of reported speech, and even some Hadhdhāl correspondence, also survive in officials' private papers. Collections of tribal poetry provide a further window into the histories of the ʿAmārāt and their sheikhs.12 Read critically, these materials shed light on the leadership of Ibn Hadhdhāl and even permit us to recover something of the intentions, actions, and tensions among ordinary ʿAmārāt tribesmen.
There remain deficiencies and gaps in our sources. European accounts of the ʿAmārāt were irregular and superficial before the First World War. Thereafter, they might treat their subjects with romantic enthusiasm one 10 Wilson and Bell, Review: 41. Johann Büssow has described the ʿAnaza as an imagined community, and one which only occasionally translated into coherent action at its largest possible scale: J. Despite possessing extensive agricultural estates, Ibn Hadhdhāl spent several months of the year in the desert grazing his personal herds among other ʿAmārāt groups. These movements went beyond those dictated by rainfall and markets: they allowed Ibn Hadhdhāl to renew his influence among disparate groups and over a large grazing territory, to demonstrate his capacity to mediate disputes, and to assert his independence of distant governments. There is also evidence that Ibn Hadhdhāl understood such movements as an asset to his personal reputation, a chance to remind ordinary tribesmen of his own capacity to endure desert hardships.19 It followed that Ibn Hadhdhāl became a recognised pole of influence in the southeastern Syrian Desert-his hospitality well renowned (and funded by the Razāza estates), his camp a magnet for the disaffected and ambitious.20 In a culture in which generosity conferred power and prestige, one British visitor reported up to forty guests regularly dining in Fahd's tent on mansaf served on a great copper plate eight feet in diameter.21 In the oral tradition of the Ẓafīr, who lived on the fringes of the ʿAmārāt's influence, the Hadhdhāl sheikhs appear frequently (though not always sympathetically) as symbols of great power in the desert.22
One source of this considerable influence was the sheikh's willingness and ability to restrict access to the Euphrates market towns. Tensions between the ʿAmārāt and the Ruwala late in 1912, for example, precluded the latter from trading at Najaf. For the ʿAmārāt and their sheikh, in contrast, the British connection brought access to more concrete resources. Ibn Hadhdhāl received a personal subsidy of twelve thousand rupees a month and protection for his cultivated estates: a more regular income, one officer calculated, than that collected as khuwwa before the war.33 More importantly, British goodwill saw the ʿAmārāt through the disastrous winter of 1917-18. It is hard to overstate the impact this had on Bedouin across the Arab East, as crop failures, locust plagues, wartime requisitions, and an Allied blockade combined in a perfect storm of famine and destitution. ʿAnaza groups crossed the Syrian Desert from west to east to escape these depredations: at one stage, perhaps as many as 100,000 Bedouin were being fed by the British authorities in Mesopotamia.34 Through their sheikh's support for the British war effort, the ʿAmārāt secured vital supplies of dates and grain and were spared the worst of the shortages.35
Power, prestige, and influence were remarkably fluid in the vacuum between the Ottoman retreat and the British advance. As Britain's administrative responsibilities in Mesopotamia began to outstrip its knowledge of the country, the ʿAmārāt and their sheikh were able to turn their peripheral location into a political asset. In 1917, the ease with which enemy supplies passed through the Syrian Desert became of increasing concern to the British. Their reports hint at the scale of the problem, with large caravans setting out from 31 D.G. Hogarth, "Obituary: Lieut.-Colonel G.E. Leachman." The Geographical Journal 56 (1920) Kuwait, Karbala, and Najaf for Ḥāʾil, Aleppo, and Damascus.36 Lacking the expertise or the influence to stop these flows, the British asked Ibn Hadhdhāl to identify smugglers and intercept contraband on their behalf. He seized the opportunity.37 The ʿAmārāt's role in regulating desert trade became their most important contribution to the Allied cause. It also provides a window onto the sheikh's attempts to navigate the war, the ʿAmārāt's condition in the immediate post-war years, and the persistence of pre-war political dynamics within the conduct of the war itself. The Anglo-ʿAmārāt control regime was run through a system of issuing passes, monitoring migrations, and despatching desert patrols. Permits to draw supplies from the markets under government control were issued directly by the British authorities or indirectly through confederate sheikhs, Ibn Hadhdhāl prominent among them.38 Those caught carrying supplies without a pass or deviating from their declared destination were liable to be detained and to have their supplies seized; in some instances, ʿAmārāt groups attacked suspected smugglers and kept the supplies for themselves. The system aimed to starve the Ottoman armies of materiel, but also to prevent Iraq's own harvest from "leaking into the desert," lured by the near-famine prices prevailing in Bilād al-Shām.39 It similarly targeted the activities of the Ottomans' Arab allies, including Ibn Rashīd of the Shammar, who professed hostility to Britain in the name of Ottoman authority, while profiting from its absence.40 The evidence is fragmentary, but these efforts appear to have had some effect on the Ottomans and their allies.41 Ibn Hadhdhāl, however, was motivated by something less than loyalty.
At a basic level, by supporting the blockade, the sheikh put the political advantage of increased British goodwill above the short-term pecuniary advantages of smuggling.42 This earned him valuable political capital, which he was not hesitant to cash in. In a letter describing Colonel Leachman, the British officer attached to his camp in this period, he pointed out that the ʿAmārāt's record of intercepting Ottoman contraband had rightly reassured the authorities "as to our friendship to the British Government."43 Less prominent ʿAmārāt tribesmen may not always have been as restrained or as concerned for British opinion: some were caught releasing smugglers in exchange for payment.44 But, in general, their contribution to the blockade guaranteed them preferential access to Euphrates markets for the remainder of the war. It is this concern for keeping markets open for his tribesmen, more than anything else, that explains the timing of Ibn Hadhdhāl's decision to declare for Great Britain.45 But the ʿAmārāt's role in enforcing the blockade hints at deeper connections between trade, influence, and Bedouin authority, agendas that were never fully lost beneath the ebb and flow of the war. The first connection concerns the relationship between a sheikh's capacity to secure access to markets and the degree of his political authority. ʿAnaza sheikhs had long sought to control the approaches to Euphrates markets for political as well as economic ends. British victories in the riverine zone threatened this position-their officers fell into established patterns of withholding access to extract Bedouin "compliance"-but Fahd's active role in this 42 Nūrī al-Shaʿlān's son Nawwaf, in contrast, was thought to be "up to his neck in the contraband business": K. Even the Ruwala, who had long exercised considerable autonomy of the nominal ʿAnaza chief, and who were loath "to be beholden in any way to Fahad in the procuring of supplies," had to set aside their differences with the ʿAmārāt to access Mespotamian markets.48 By the end of the war, the ʿAmārāt were involved in seizing contraband and dispatching agents throughout Iraq's Southern Desert, welcoming groups from even further afield and selling camels and other pastoral products to supply Sherifian forces. It is a good indication of the wealth, influence, and largesse that flowed from this position that Ibn Saʿūd eyed it covetously and was, by 1918, requesting equal rights and privileges. 49 The second dynamic operating throughout the Anglo-ʿAmārāt blockade was the ongoing rivalry between the ʿAnaza and the Shammar. This enmity had deep roots. Since the early eighteenth century, groups affiliated with both of these great Bedouin confederations clashed as they moved north from Arabia into the Syrian Desert. Driven by political instability and climatic stress, the Shammar were gradually pushed across the Euphrates and into the Jazīra.50 These successive waves of migration formed the human landscape into which 46 "It is this need of laying in stocks of supplies," a British report confessed frankly, "that gives the Governments of ʿIraq and Syria their main hold over these birds of the desert": IOR: L/PS/10/621, Eadie, "Nomad Arab Tribes." 47 K. Cornwallis (ed.) European imperialism now crashed; for some years after the region's partition, its consequences would continue to play out. For the ʿAmārāt, Ibn Hadhdhāl's control of the wartime blockade provided a new economic weapon in this long struggle. Shammar groups allied to the Ottomans complained about their restricted freedom of movement and inability to access Euphrates markets. Some initially found relief in smuggling, but from 1917 their loss of access to Najaf and Samāwa took an increasingly heavy toll.51 Even after the war, as we shall see, Fahd Ibn Hadhdhāl clung to the pass system as a way of staying ahead of the Shammar in a revived competition for opportunities, resources, and patronage. Finally, the workings of the pass system also provide an insight into established tensions within the ʿAmārāt-in particular, Fahd's attempts to retain influence over the Dahamsha. In the past, the sheikhs of this subdivision had claimed to be equal in importance to Ibn Hadhdhāl himself, wintering in separate grazing grounds and enjoying considerable independence of his authority.52 During the war, one group of Dahamsha, under Muḥammad Ibn Turkī, chose to camp with the pro-Turk ʿUjaymi al-Saʿdūn. Another, under Muḥammad Ibn Mijlad, offered to join King Hussein in the Hijaz "in order to get round our arrangement with Fahad Ibn Hadhdhāl."53 This, Fahd told the British, angered him more than any amount of Shammar raiding.54 He responded by using the pass system, and the threat of withholding permission to trade, in an attempt to rein in the autonomy of these sheikhs. Nor was he afraid to lean on Britain for support when faced with disobedience. Well into the 1920s, the British observed Ibn Hadhdhāl using trade "as a lever for political purposes . . . with a view to giving him control over the Aneizah," and while there is evidence of evasion of the pass system in the later 1920s, it enabled him to act as a kind of gatekeeper for some years more.55 The Dahamsha openly criticised this new state of affairs-Ibn Hadhdhāl, they claimed, had become "too self-assured"-and quickly identified the pass system as a major grievance.56 By 1923 several Bedouin groups were reported to have changed their musābala patterns rather than "submit to the indignity of soliciting permission from Fahad Beg."57 When Ibn Turki attempted, in 1926, to circumvent the system, threatening to move to Najd if the government did not withdraw it, Fahd even had a British official sent to impress on the sheikh "the futility of trying to kick against Fahad's control."58 Interestingly, the British were aware that they, and the pass system, were being played in this way. One report freely accepted that their close relationship with any given sheikh would inevitably distort his relations with others.59 They even appreciated that embittered Dahamsha sheikhs were well placed to relocate beyond their effective jurisdiction and wished that, in the interests of amity, Fahd might "exercise himself a little more and Government a little less."60 But it is a reminder of the weakness of Britain's position in the desert that, for the time being at least, they stood by Ibn Hadhdhāl. He had, in British eyes, "long been the main stabilising factor in the Anizah areas"; should the Dahamsha be allowed to break away "Fahad declares that it will be the beginning of unsettlement throughout the Anizah."61
The inner workings of the Anglo-ʿAmārāt blockade reveal how important Bedouin agendas and concerns continued to operate throughout the turmoil of the First World War. It would also set the tone for the tribe's interactions with the occupying power in the immediate post-war years. By the mid-1920s, we can glimpse the ʿAmārāt sheikh acting as a mediator in numerous disputes. He supported government claims during the Dayr al-Zūr crisis, a tense standoff with Arab nationalist forces in the Iraqi-Syrian borderlands. In the south, he took in refugee tribesmen at the government's request and confiscated loot from those raiding into Najd, all the while preserving his own contacts.62 trade to Shetatah instead of Rahaliyah, the latter town witnessed scenes of disorder and discontent. Throughout, what stands out are the opportunities afforded the ʿAmārāt and their sheikh as the state of flux that had marked the war years survived the process of partition.63 Britain's limited penetration of Iraq's southern and western frontiers, its unfamiliarity with the country's topography and personalities, the political and fiscal pressures to withdraw its troops, the twin distractions of Turkish revanchism and Kurdish unrest, and its fears of a desert awash with modern rifles, all pushed in the direction of allowing prominent sheikhs wide autonomy in the conduct of their affairs. There were, after all, worse people to back. As a substantial livestock owner, officers reasoned, Ibn Hadhdhāl would necessarily "favour quiet tribal conditions," while his "tactful friendship" with Ibn Saʿūd afforded "a useful and convenient channel of approach" between two governments that did not yet formally recognise one another.64 Allowing prominent ʿAnaza sheikhs such latitude "might well shock French theorists of suzerainty," an intelligence officer concluded, but were it to cease "the Administration would have no other machinery available."65
"Rules for Raiders": Patronage and Politicking in the Mid-1920s
The war had been good to Fahd Ibn Hadhdhāl, but he could not afford to be complacent. His position depended upon balancing the goodwill of the colonial power with the support of ordinary tribesmen. As the decade wore on, that meant navigating a path through the government's growing anxieties about Bedouin raiding. For the British officials based in Baghdad, raiding was seen, by turns, as harmless sport, a menace to "law and order," an expression of desert anarchy, and a threat to the conduct of foreign policy (or, by some around the Hashemite court, as a way of conducting that policy by other means). It was a stated condition of Ibn Hadhdhāl's lucrative subsidy that he prevent his tribesmen from conducting raids. Among the Bedouin of the Arab East, however, raiding itself fulfilled a vital economic function, as a mechanism for recouping herd losses and redistributing wealth. It was Ibn Hadhdhāl's bold attempt to square these two constituencies-to satisfy both Baghdad's calls to uphold "law and order" and his supporters' concern for the economy of raiding-that gave rise to one of the most remarkable experiments in government in the history of the mandates. Late in the summer of 1925, flights of British aircraft flew over the southern and western deserts of Iraq, dropping bundles of leaflets on the Bedouin below. The leaflets announced, to those who could read them, an end to the authorities' attempts to outlaw tribal raiding. Instead, the government of Iraq would now tolerate "internal" raiding between the ʿAnaza, Shammar, and Ẓafīr. As long as raiding parties remained within national borders, gave notice of their targets, avoided main roads, and left settled populations and travellers alone, raiding and counter-raiding would not be treated as a crime. Improbable as it may sound, these conditions were assembled in a printed list of "Rules for Raiders" and dropped over selected Bedouin camps. Intelligence officers and police posts were issued with logbooks and instructed to keep a record of who raided what from whom. Only "external" raiding, given its implications for foreign relations, would require intervention. The distinction, meaningless to most Bedouin groups, became cemented by legislation in September 1925. 66 The experiment was controversial, even in its day.67 Officials soon confessed their difficulties in registering raiding parties and in separating "internal" raiding from "external" consequences. They struggled to distinguish trans-border raids from "the large numbers of raids which are constantly coming and going," while a system permitting certain tribes to raid in certain circumstances simply added to the confusion of authority in the desert.68 Groups long thought to have "abandoned" raiding were motivated to take up arms once more. Before long, reports were received of unauthorised raids conducted outside the "Rules." Attacks on caravans, travellers, and settled tribes proved "lamentably frequent"; a "welter of blood feuds" ensued. In July 1926, the scheme was scrapped; it had lasted less than a year.69 The "Rules for Raiders" episode barely features in most histories of Iraq and, where it does, is easily dismissed as a flight of imperial fancy.70 There is something hubristic, even absurd, in the image of British aircraft scattering pamphlets across a windblown desert; it recalls Joseph Conrad's gunboat on the edge of the African bush, "firing into a continent." Yet such a reading treats the Bedouin themselves too lightly: it fails to acknowledge how much this most unorthodox of policy proscriptions owed to Bedouin pressures and interests. Viewed in the appropriate context, the "Rules for Raiders" scheme is a telling example of how Bedouin political and economic agendas could still drive interwar politics. To see this, we must locate the scheme at the junction of three forces that were buffeting the young mandate for Iraq: the revived competition for resources between the ʿAmārāt and the Shammar; the political pluralism of the mandatory regime; and ongoing tensions within the ʿAmārāt themselves.
Before the state developed a comprehensive, bureaucratic system of "desert administration," Iraq's Southern Desert remained a contested space between British officialdom, Saudi expansionism, the Hashemite court, and the Bedouin themselves. The stakes were high for all the parties. For the British, much of their influence in the Middle East rested on balancing the goodwill of Ibn Saʿūd and their evolving relationship with the Hashemites. The Foreign Office and India Office, in particular, were anxious to keep the emir of Najd on side: his "more or less ordered" rule offered the best protection for imperial communications, the "independence" of the Persian Gulf and, after Ibn Saʿūd's capture of Mecca and Medina, the quiescence of India's Muslims. 71 The Hashemite King Fayṣal of Iraq, in contrast, watched the rise of Ibn Saʿūd with alarm. He saw the Bedouin groups along his southern frontier as the most ready means of containing, even countering, the threat of Saudi expansion. Ibn Saʿūd, for his part, was determined to avoid being encircled to the north by an arc of hostile Hashemite states. In April 1921, even as Fayṣal's candidacy for the Iraqi throne was being announced, Ibn Saʿūd wrote to Fahd Ibn Hadhdhāl claiming authority over all the ʿAnaza.72 As these forces jostled for authority 70 For John Glubb, the scheme was the product of the romantic enthusiasm of "the League With the fall of Ḥāʾil to Ibn Saʿūd's forces in November 1921, Saudi power was being projected into the Syrian Desert for the first time in a century, pressing on the frontiers of the Hashemite domains of Trans-Jordan and Iraq. Several Shammar groups associated with the defeated Ibn Rashīd now fled north into Iraq. Many passed through the ʿAmārāt to join the Iraqi Shammar in the Jazīra; others remained in ʿAmārāt territory and in the vicinity of the frontier. Once in Iraq, however, their hostility to Saudi expansion found a welcome audience in the king. Keen to develop desert connections independent of British control, Fayṣal came to look on the Shammar as his proxy on the frontier, the best instrument available for checking Saudi power. If land grants formed the key currency of Fayṣal's relationship with rural notables, then permission to raid was now being made to work the same way for Bedouin sheikhs. In 1923 the king permitted Shammar groups under ʿAjīl al-Yāwir to raise a desert force to guard the Euphrates line. The following year, he invited al-Yāwir to patrol the Nāṣiriyya and Dīwāniyya provinces (liwāʾs) and repel any attacks by Ikhwān from across the border.73 Before long, he was giving his tacit approval to illicit Shammar raids into Najd itself.74 The ʿAmārāt were not simply shut out of these lucrative opportunities; they feared they would ultimately face the brunt of Saudi reprisals.
The British were "gravely embarrassed" by these events, fearful of the damage that Fayṣal and the Shammar might do to their own relationship with Ibn Saʿūd, yet they still baulked at the cost and risk of developing their own administrative presence in the desert. So they too tried their hand at managing the desert through patronage. Both ʿAjīl al-Yāwir of the Shammar and Fahd Ibn Hadhdhāl of the ʿAmārāt were offered official subsidies to strengthen their hold over their respective followers, curb Bedouin raiding (especially those "embarrassing" trans-border affairs), and monitor the country's new trans-desert routes.75 Al-Yāwir ultimately proved unable (or disinclined) to prevent the Shammar from raiding, but Ibn Hadhdhāl became increasingly important to Britain, upholding its interests along Iraq's frontiers while tempering Fayṣal's influence.76 When they invited the sheikh to establish and man desert outposts at Muhaywir and Rutba, the British were effectively underwriting a parallel source of authority in the desert, shadowing a Shammari "Desert Police" favoured by the king. 77 The arrangement had advantages for the ʿAmārāt and their sheikh. For Ibn Hadhdhāl, the position again helped his standing as a man of influence on the frontiers of Iraq. He accepted it only on the condition that the government be prepared to underwrite his authority, with police support if necessary. 78 The patrols, meanwhile, provided a means of checking Shammar activity while renewing the sheikh's private contacts with Ibn Saʿūd. As the man responsible for confiscating and restoring loot raided from Najd (including on the numerous raids made by the Shammar refugees), he entered an active correspondence with Ibn Saʿūd's governor at Ḥāʾil, taking care to distinguish his actions from those of the Hashemite regime.79 Little wonder, then, that the Hadhdhāl clan came to be viewed "with suspicion and dislike at the Palace." 80 For ordinary ʿAmārāt tribesmen too, the patrols formed part of an ongoing struggle for subsidies and positions-a form of maintaining markets, as William Lancaster observed.81 They guaranteed the ʿAmārāt's access to the important springs and wells at Muhaywir, while some also saw an opportunity to keep for themselves the camels seized from raiders and to pursue old vendettas against the Shammar.82 These patrols also addressed the favouritism with which the police recruited heavily from among the Shammar and then turned 183
The ʿ Amārāt, their Sheikh, and the Colonial State jesho 58 (2015) a blind eye to Shammari raids (including those against the ʿAmārāt).83 As the British intelligence officer at Ramadi observed, Ibn Hadhdhāl was plainly "jealous that the [Dulaym] Desert Police should contain such a preponderance of Shammar (Nejdi, be it noted, not Jazireh) over Anaiza": if he could not do something to redress this, his influence would necessarily suffer.84
By the summer of 1925, however, there were signs that ʿAmārāt frustration was beginning to boil over. Ibn Hadhdhāl's undertaking to prevent ʿAmārāt raids brought him recognition and financial rewards from the government, but it now began to erode his authority among ordinary tribesmen. In June, a group of ʿAmārāt raided the Shammar near Ramadi, tired of putting up with Shammar raids. When confronted about this by British officials, the ʿAmārāt claimed, not without grounds, that Shammar raids had, for too long, been protected by their close connections with the government police.85 Ibn Hadhdhāl now weighed in, accusing ʿAjīl al-Yāwir of breaking a recent truce, and telling the Special Service Officer "how delighted he would be if the Government would openly countenance raiding so that he could get his own back."86
This was not simply a question of self-defence. Resources may have been particularly scarce in the summer and autumn of 1925. ʿAjīl al-Yāwir confessed he could not prevent the Shammar from raiding because "food is scarce, grazing is poor, and hunger and poverty [are] driving his people to crime."87 It seems likely that similar pressures were acting upon Fahd Ibn Hadhdhāl: it pushed him to seek a restoration of the economy of raiding, not least to shore up support among members of his own tribe. It is particularly significant that it was the Dahamsha sheikhs-those most impatient with Hadhdhāl control-who were most anxious to see raiding restored. Until recently, it was they who had been "constantly raiding into the Jazireh, and on the whole they were more successful than the Shammar."88 They complained expressly about the injustice of a situation in which Fahd profited handsomely from his government subsidy but, by preventing raiding, seemed to be denying others the opportunity of enriching themselves. In the fluid, multi-polar Middle East that partition had helped create, no sheikh could afford to ignore such sentiments for long. Throughout the 1920s, groups disgruntled with Hadhdhāl's ascendancy 184 fletcher jesho 58 (2015) were prepared to seek out alternative sources of influence, wealth, and largesse; in 1923, for example, Dahamsha "dissatisfied with the Government of Iraq favouring . . . Ibn Hadhdhāl" had visited Ibn Saʿūd in Najd. 89 All this forced Ibn Hadhdhāl to act in the economic interests of ordinary tribesmen. In July 1925, Fahd sent his son Maḥrūt to Baghdad to request official permission "to protect themselves from Shammar aggression." Maḥrūt claimed the ʿAnaza had lost some two thousand camels to these raids in recent months and sought to draw on his father's influence with the British to have at least some of them restored.90 Early in August, Fahd received word that the government would attempt to recover the loot from the Shammar and that, if its efforts proved unsuccessful, counter-raids might be permitted "to make good their losses."91 Meanwhile, Maḥrūt remained in the capital, pressing his complaints and urging the resumption of raiding. On 24 August, his lobbying paid off. Both Maḥrūt Ibn Hadhdhāl and ʿAjīl al-Yāwir of the Shammar were summoned before the High Commissioner, and during the discussion that followed it became quite clear that both shaikhs wished to be freed from the undertaking which they had given to the ʿIraq Government last winter that they would prevent raiding between their tribes. They preferred to revert to a state of open warfare on the ground that their tribes wished it; and under the present restraint were falling away from them and taking themselves to Syrian territory where such warfare is not interfered with. Both shaikhs declared that, unless their tribes were permitted to carry on their traditional raiding, they would not be able to keep them together under them and the bulk would desert to Syrian territory. They agreed that if this state of warfare were permitted, they would not bother the government with complaints against each other but would recognise that their only redress lay in retaliation and counter raids.92 The High Commissioner, Sir Henry Dobbs, responded with a set of conditions, and the ministry and the government were yet to make it all legal, but the "Rules for Raiders" had essentially been set. Ibn Hadhdhāl's intervention was crucial in overturning British reservations about the scheme. Even then, Dobbs acquiesced in the proposal only "very reluctantly."93 Knowing how things would later work out, we might wonder why he agreed at all. There were, perhaps, hints of romanticism in the decision: the references to "ancient" predatory habits, or the sporting analogies that peppered British raid reports. But the experiment also reveals the limits of imperial authority over Iraq's arid frontiers at this time. That image of British aircraft scattering leaflets over the desert below should serve as a reminder of the very real difficulties all governments faced in controlling vast, illegible environments in the early twentieth century. Many feared that banning raiding would only drive the Bedouin to flee the state's jurisdiction altogether or so undermine the authority of their principal contacts in the desert as to erase all pretence of influence or control. The alternative-developing a permanent administrative infrastructure-seemed even more daunting. Viewed from this perspective, the "Rules for Raiders" scheme becomes a story of Bedouin sheikhs and ordinary tribesmen negotiating from a position of strength and shaping, in turn, the actions of the state.94
British officials weighed the pros and cons of a resumption of raiding and concluded, reluctantly, that the threat to Ibn Hadhdhāl's authority was more than they could afford. The true progenitors of the scheme were the ʿAmārāt themselves. For them, it was an attempt to reset the clock back to the war, when the British connection had enabled the ʿAmārāt to raid the Shammar with official blessing and support. British accounts at the time described these expeditions in terms of "using friendly Arabs to attack [our] enemies."95 Looking back from the distance of a century, it is less clear who was using whom. In November 1919, for example, the British asked their "great asset," Ibn Hadhdhāl, to attack the Shammar Jarbah, who had been threatening cultivators in the Dulaym division. The outcome was a success but not just for the British: when the ʿAmārāt returned, they did so one thousand camels and five hundred sheep richer.96
In the eleven months of the "Rules for Raiders" scheme, government policy was similarly being moulded by the force of existing Bedouin dynamics. The scheme is proof of the extraordinary lengths to which the agency of ordinary Bedouin could force sheikhs, and even the state, to go. And if the origins of the licensed raiding scheme had deeper roots, so too did the consequences of its collapse. For Britain, it dealt a blow to a broader vision of managing the steppe through patronage. Ibn Hadhdhāl, meanwhile, was put in the difficult position of forbidding the ʿAmārāt from raiding (and returning any loot his tribesmen did happen to take) without the means of launching raids in their defence. This was "a heavy burden" that sheikhs across the Arab East were increasingly being made to carry. "It may be workable in the case of a man with the influence of Fahad," one officer reasoned, but for those in a weaker position "the system will not work so easily."97 It was soon put to the test.
3
The ʿAmārāt, their Sheikh, and the Ikhwān Revolt
The collapse of the licensed raiding scheme was bound to cause friction between the ʿAmārāt and their sheikh, but two events worked together in the late 1920s to make matters even worse. In 1927, Fahd Ibn Hadhdhāl died, and the colonial sources make clear that his son and successor Maḥrūt did not "carry the influence formerly wielded by his father."98 Many blamed this on the weakness of Maḥrūt's personality. Because he had grown up since the arrival of the British and "in the hey-day of the Hadhdhāl fortunes," he had "never been through the fire of tribulation." He was, in short, born in the purple. Accustomed to spend unlimited money and be treated with great respect both by tribesmen and Government officials, he is inclined to be vain, extravagant and affected. . Such verdicts on Maḥrūt's character were common, but as an explanation of his difficulties as sheikh they leave something to be desired. The importance of a stable succession would have been axiomatic, and most sheikhs would have prepared for the day by gradually introducing their successor to share in their public duties.100 Why, then, was Fahd's death so disruptive?
Gerald de Gaury, then a British intelligence officer attached to Air Headquarters in Iraq, offered a different assessment. "In assessing [Maḥrūt's] character," he wrote in a 1932 Review of the 'Anizah Tribe, it should be remembered that he suffered from an exceptionally strong and well-known father who lived to a great age, which consequently, and particularly on account of the Oriental custom of keeping the son in the background while the father is alive, gave him a difficult start.101
This hints at a more likely explanation of the hurdles Maḥrūt faced. Fahd had, in fact, begun preparing for his succession before the First World War, but not with Maḥrūt in mind. Maḥrūt's mother was a Shammari, to whom Fahd had been married for a few years, and, after their divorce, the young Maḥrūt was raised with her, away from his father and the ʿAmārāt.102 Meanwhile, another son, Mitʿab, was being groomed for the succession, leading ʿAmārāt raids during the First World War and helping to enforce the blockade. The British considered Mitʿab "a capable man" and issued him his own monthly stipend.103 But in December 1918 he was badly wounded in a raid on the Shammar. His death the following month was reported by the British as "a severe loss both to ourselves and to the Anizeh. Fahd's death was not the only thing to increase tensions among the ʿAmārāt in 1927. Later that year, Ibn Saʿūd's relationship with the Ikhwān-the semi-settled tribes of Wahhabi faith that had been so critical to his earlier expansion-dramatically unravelled. With the conquest of the Hijaz complete and seeking accommodation with Britain's presence in the region, Ibn Saʿūd had attempted to rein in Ikhwān activism by restricting their raiding, grazing, and trading privileges. The result was the revolt, over the next three years, of large sections of the Mutayr, Harb, and Ajman tribes along the frontiers of Saudi authority. A series of brutal raids began that November; perhaps as many as four hundred Iraqi tribesmen were killed before Ibn Saʿūd re-established control.107 Most accounts of the Ikhwān Revolt approach it from a political, diplomatic, or military perspective, exploring its impact on the international relations of Britain, Najd, and Iraq or its place in narratives of Saudi state building.108 But the crisis generated a wealth of correspondence that also sheds light on the histories of the Bedouin groups who were drawn into its orbit.
The Revolt had an immediate impact on the ʿAnaza living in the southern and western deserts of Iraq. From Baghdad, Henry Dobbs reported that "unless effective measures were taken to prevent further raids" and "restore the confidence" of the ʿAnaza, there was "a serious danger that they would desert Iraq and join the Akhwan."109 Grazing conditions made matters even worse. Most of the rain had fallen close to the border the previous winter so that, by March 1928, practically all the nomad "Iraq tribes" were bunched together close along the Najd frontier where grazing is comparatively plentiful, even the Anaizah having deserted their usual haunts and gone far to the south. Thus they offer to the Najd raiders a bait and target of quite unusual proportions.110
This exerted tremendous pressure on the government and on Maḥrūt Ibn Hadhdhāl to organise some form of active defence and to permit counterraiding. One Bedouin group was reported to have put on Ikhwān dress in the presence of a British officer and to have denounced the government, saying 189
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These voices only became louder when, instead of letting tribes counterraid, the government ordered them back from the frontier, despite the inevitable herd losses that would be caused by abandoning their grazing grounds.112 Once again, it was the Dahamsha who became the most visible symbol of resentment and unrest. From Dīwāniyya, John Glubb, the administrative inspector, reported "serious danger of the Anaizah seceding unless they see vigorous preparations [for defence]." The Dahamsha of Jazza Ibn Mijlad were openly talking of abandoning Maḥrūt Ibn Hadhdhāl for Najd; half the Ẓafīr had already gone over to Ibn Saʿūd.113 When the High Commissioner met with Maḥrūt Ibn Hadhdhāl in March, it was all he could do to dissuade him from commencing counter-raiding on his own terms.114
Sensing the stakes, the British did establish a temporary police post to protect the Dahamsha grazing grounds. In an inversion of an earlier turn of phrase, it was now their "stabilization," by Britain, that had become important for "the control of the Anaizah."115 Nonetheless, the official response of the British was still temporary and military in its assumptions. The British Residency and the Air Officer Commanding announced the creation of a cordon sanitaire, a line of defence patrolled by aircraft and armoured cars, behind which all tribes were ordered to retreat. Any Bedouin discovered between that line and the frontier would be considered hostile and liable to attack, creating a considerable buffer between the Euphrates and the frontier but cutting off access to grazing. It also explicitly denied a role in defence for the Bedouin themselves.116 Despite the deteriorating situation, the British remained set against the idea: the shadow of the failure of the licensed raiding experiment, the speed with which it had unravelled, and the unpredictability of its consequences for Britain's relationship with Ibn Saʿūd hung over this decision.
Fayṣal had no such reservations. In fact, his very enthusiasm for a resumption of Bedouin raiding only hardened British opposition to the idea. For the 111 AIR 23/33, High Commissioner, Baghdad to Secretary of State for Colonies, 29 December 1927 . 112 AIR 23/36, High Commissioner, Baghdad to Colonial Office, telegram, 1 March 1928 . 113 AIR 23/36, Glubb to Cornwallis, 23 February 1928 AIR 23/36, High Commissioner, Baghdad to Colonial Office, telegram, 1 March 1928 . 114 AIR 23/37, H. Dobbs (High Commissioner, Baghdad), untitled note, 10 March 1928 . 115 FO 371/ 12992-4, Dobbs to Amery, telegram, 25 May 1928 , 31 May 1928 FO 371/ 12992-4, Dobbs to Amery, 31 May 1928 . 116 AIR 23/34, R. Jope-Slade, "Situation Report-Southern Desert," 27 January 1928 king, the Ikhwān Revolt against Ibn Saʿūd's authority presented an opportunity to step up the conflict with his old dynastic rival. It was an open secret in British circles in Baghdad that Fayṣal was encouraging Bedouin groups along the frontier to assist the Ikhwān; by the latter stages of the revolt, many suspected that a full-fledged conspiracy with Najdi Shammar had been hatched.117 Lobbying for the use of tribal forces was also "part of [a] campaign for obtaining more powers" by the king: a way to strengthen his hand in (and circumvent British supervision of) military affairs.118 Fayṣal made it clear that his own contacts among the Shammar, Dahamsha, and Ẓafīr would form the basis of any tribal force. He remained deeply wary of the Hadhdhāl clan, given their long association with British influence in the desert, and expressly excluded them from his preparations. In 1927, he had been responsible for cutting Fahd's subsidy and actively promoting the feud with the Dahamsha in order to further erode his authority.119 Now, Fayṣal dismissed Fahd's son as a man "absorbed in his personal interests" while reaching out to others in the ʿAmārāt, especially Maḥrūt's rivals among the Dahamsha, to join his Bedouin force.120 While the High Commissioner was pouring cold water on Maḥrūt's request to take up arms, the king invited several Shammar sheikhs and Ibn Mijlad of the Dahamsha to serve as commanders of any future camel corps.121
In addition to Fayṣal's attempts to undermine Maḥrūt and the discontent among the ʿAmārāt at being unable to raid, financial troubles placed further strain on the relationship between the ʿAmārāt and their sheikh. Prohibition of khuwwa and frustrated access to grazing affected the prospects of all the nomads of the Shāmiyya, but Ibn Hadhdhāl's privileged position in regulating desert trade meant he perhaps had further to fall. Soon after the revolt began, the British contacted Maḥrūt to resurrect the blockade arrangements that had both demonstrated and enhanced his father's economic power during the First World War. It only then became apparent that Maḥrūt's pass system no longer carried the same force. When the administrative inspector spoke with the sheikh about the blockade, he was surprised to see how "Maḥrūt jumped at the idea" as a way "to recover his old pass system": officials in Baghdad had assumed that it had never declined. It seemed that the permits Maḥrūt issued to conduct musābala "ha [d] 123 The arrangements devised for the new desert blockade reflected this state of affairs. When the new system went into effect in January 1929, the British and Iraqi authorities permitted many more sheikhs to issue passes than they had during the war. Seven Dahamsha sheikhs, four from the Ẓafīr, and eight from the Shammar were all given this responsibility; Maḥrūt's jurisdiction covered only those wishing to supply in the Dulaym liwa. 124 The British even saw this levelling of the pass system as a chance to improve relations with the Dahamsha, "who have always resented the power" the system had given to the Hadhdhāl clan.125 It was, moreover, a position the British were disinclined to reinstate. The Hadhdhāl pass system had been an asset in the past, Glubb wrote to Cornwallis, but "I doubt if it is advisable to go back."126 It would only be supported until "the new regime of permanent official control of desert affairs has had time to establish itself." 127 The decline of the pass system during the 1920s contributed to a general erosion of Maḥrūt's economic influence. His monopoly of the bāj, the per capita tax on ʿAnaza camels, was so easily evaded that, in 1928, officials proposed abolishing it and conducting their own count.128 Two years later, ʿAnaza caravans were again reported to have found a way around the sheikh's taxes, by avoiding the towns and purchasing their supplies directly from farmers instead.129 In a letter of 1930, John Glubb recounted an interview with the tearful sheikh, in which Maḥrūt set out the causes and consequences of his reduced position. He was badly indebted to his agent in Karbala, he said, and could no longer afford to dispense the largesse required to maintain his influence with his followers. His subsidy had been slashed by the Ministry of Finance-a move driven by "political hostility, not genuine economy"-while the revenue from his estates did not make up the shortfall ("he is not very clever at business," Glubb added). 130 Glubb saw two ways out of the dilemma: to shore up Maḥrūt's position with an increased subsidy or a loan or to cut him loose and "take over the whole business [of tribal control] with government forces." Neither was without cost or risk, and neither, in fact, was fully carried out. But the events of the Ikhwān Revolt seem to have marked a turning point in Britain's approach to administering the desert. Hadhdhāl authority was not what it had once been, and, from now on, the government would be increasingly prepared to deal with the tribes itself.
Did this amount to a loss of Bedouin autonomy? Maḥrūt may well have thought so-in a few short years, he had become increasingly marginalised from the dialogue between the ʿAmārāt and the colonial state-but it is not clear that more ordinary tribesmen saw things in those terms. After all, it was their threats of wholesale defection to Najd, combined with the need to head off Fayṣal's bids for their allegiance, that had drawn the British deeper into desert affairs. Throughout the second half of the 1920s, there is good evidence of ʿAmārāt tribesmen appealing to government, rather than to the sheikh, to defend their central interests.131 Even those Dahamsha who had already fled to Najd spoke of their readiness to return, but only if Maḥrūt "ceased to be the channel through which Government orders are delivered" and if the government dealt with them directly.132 By 1928, Maḥrūt's subsidy, which had once been so conspicuous, had become merely one of many being paid to "innumerable leaders" throughout the Shāmiyya. 133 From this perspective, the growth of direct administration in the steppe need not be seen as antithetical to all forms of Bedouin autonomy. We tend to look at the processes of partition and colonial rule in terms of governments "encapsulating" nomads, binding their future to that of the nation state. From the perspective of many ordinary Bedouin, however, it was they who had negotiated the government into providing valuable services and resources in the face of the Ikhwān threat. Throughout official discussions of how best to respond to the revolt, there is a sense of government being drawn into the desert as much as stamping its loyalties on the Bedouin. Officials found themselves
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The ʿ Amārāt, their Sheikh, and the Colonial State jesho 58 (2015) taking up obligations established by active sheikhs in the recent past and being judged by the expectations of ordinary tribesmen. In Bedouin eyes, government itself became an alternate means of securing generosity, protection, positions, and access to grazing and markets. As William Lancaster explained more than thirty years ago, these were precisely the things that mattered most to ordinary tribesmen.134 The focus on the more elite Bedouin interests of independence and political activism, in contrast, may have led us to stress discontinuity unduly. The sheikh of the ʿAmārāt-paramount sheikh of the ʿAnaza, no less-may have cared a great deal about asserting his autonomy of government. For others, it may have been other forms of autonomy-a freedom from want, perhaps, or a freedom from fear-that were always foremost in their minds.
Conclusion
The three episodes presented here provide a glimpse into the history of a Bedouin group that has seldom been the focus of enquiry. They also suggest the myriad ways in which the Bedouin, their sheikhs, and multiple branches of the state became entangled in a newly partitioned Middle East. Although these episodes were unique, the experience of partition and colonial rule was something shared by Bedouin across the interwar Middle East, and several wider themes emerge.
The first is that the specific characteristics of colonial rule mattered: we should hesitate to equate it with "state building" or "modernity" writ large. For much of the 1920s, the British presence on Iraq's frontiers was more cautious and its objectives more limited. Even the crisis of 1927-28 only coaxed officials in Baghdad reluctantly into a deeper engagement with the steppe. Until then, attempts to manage its affairs through patronage afforded considerable latitude to accomplished Bedouin leaders. Moreover, it is hard to speak of a single, monolithic "state" with reference to the mandates: in French Syria and British Trans-Jordan, too, authority was more often contested between a number of distinct interests and organisations, be they local, imperial, national, or dynastic. Opportunities persisted for many Bedouin groups, and forms of autonomy could be sustained, because of this pluralism at the heart of the mandatory regime. In Iraq's Southern Desert, this manifested itself recurrently in the competing attempts of both British officialdom and the Hashemite court to enlist Bedouin assistance. A second theme concerns the economic foundations of Bedouin power. Colonial sources seldom discussed it in these terms, but the idea runs throughout our three episodes, whether in terms of the influence conferred on a sheikh by his control of blockades or pass systems, or in terms of the real pressures applied by more ordinary tribesmen demanding access to pasture, markets, and other resources. For Bedouin leaders, wealth funded the generosity and hospitality so central to their wider influence and standing: in this, and in Fahd and Maḥrūt, we have a tale of two sheikhs. The wider context of partition is also relevant here, although its impact could cut two ways. New international boundaries could weaken Bedouin economies by frustrating access to grazing and shrinking herds. But for some, at least, partition also provided new opportunities. For much of the period, the ʿAmārāt were able to turn their supposed liminality-their position at the geographic limits of multiple states-to real advantage. Ibn Hadhdhāl's success in the immediate post-war year lay in realising that partition had resulted in a constellation of weaker governments between which he might act as a valued intermediary. Likewise, this multipolar Middle East provided an outlet for more ordinary tribesmen too, who demonstrated time and again their readiness to move across borders in search of patronage, protection, and gifts.
Finally, our three episodes reveal nomads acting as political catalysts as much as political actors, actively shaping their environment and not simply adapting to it. This should be a reminder, even for scholars working on the modern period, that it remains difficult to deal in the fixed, oppositional categories of "tribe" and "state," or even, from the ʿAmārāt's point of view, to discern "intrinsic" from "extrinsic" dynamics.135 As the ʿAmārāt, their sheikhs, and multiple representatives of the state all jostled for influence, the southern and western deserts of Iraq became a vast space of negotiations, creating distinct political formations and arrangements that might not otherwise have existed. Both the ongoing ʿAnaza-Shammar rivalry and established Bedouin concerns about accessing markets, for example, permeated the workings of Britain's wartime blockade. A few years later, Bedouin pressures to restore the economy of raiding combined with renewed intertribal tensions to push the government into an unparalleled experiment in licensing raids. The Ikhwān Revolt certainly weakened the hand of some sheikhs and saw the government take on some of their roles, but officials did so, at least in part, to meet the expectations
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Beyond the back-and-forth of the internal/external debate, the ʿAmārāt's experiences ultimately suggest a notion of co-production to be more appropriate. During the First World War, as British intelligence officers struggled to sift the rumours and reports emanating from the Syrian Desert, they crudely classified all Bedouin raids as "pro-Turk" or "anti-Turk." But the more astute among them accepted that, "while [these] operations will doubtless react upon ourselves and our enemies, they are primarily directed against one or more of the other Arab leaders."136 Bedouin politics, in short, was charged by the war and the war by Bedouin politics, neither being subsumed by the other. In the years that followed, governments may have come to assume greater responsibility for the desert, but their actions still owed much to previous patterns of activity and obligation.
Thinking about these problems within a framework of the mandates can help us to compare and connect disaggregated national histories,137 but it is also an invitation to examine more critically the specific political configurations that mandatory rule entailed. As the case of the ʿAmārāt makes clear, the expansion of government power and the erosion of Bedouin autonomy was by no means a linear process. It may be some time before we have a more complete history of the Syrian Desert from below, if the sources will ever permit it. But for a topic as vulnerable to false dichotomies such as the relations between "nomads and settlers" and "tribes and states," this might be a good place to start.
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